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NOTES
Contract Rights and the Successor Employer:
The Impact of Burns Security*
The extent to which a new employer is obligated to a union
that has established a bargaining relationship with a previous employer has troubled both the National Labor Relations Board and
the courts. In this context, several interests central to national labor
relations policy-freedom of contract, flexibility in the transfer of
business assets, employee job security, and industrial stabilitycollide, and a satisfactory general solution has not yet been reached.
In NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc. 1 the Supreme Court recently confronted this question in a factual setting
quite unlike the usual successorship case.2 While the Court, per
Justice White, carefully noted that the decision turned largely on
the "precise facts involved,"3 its opinion appears to establish the
following proposition of general application in NLRB proceedings:
The Board in certain circumstances can require a new employer to
recognize and bargain with the union that had established a
collective-bargaining relationship with its predecessor employer, but
the Board cannot compel it to honor the substantive terms of the
agreement that had been negotiated by the predecessor employer
and the union. In contrast, if not conflict, eight years earlier the
Supreme Court held, in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston4
that in appropriate circumstances a successor employer-in that
case the employer surviving a corporate merger-could be compelled by the courts, in an action brought under section 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act,15 to arbitrate the extent to which
the successor was bound under the collective-bargaining agreement
that was negotiated by the union with the predecessor employer.
This Note will only briefly discuss the implications of Burns
for NLRB proceedings. Instead, the focus will be on the impact
of Burns on actions to compel arbitration under section 30 I. Is the
rationale of Burns inconsistent with the rule established in Wiley
• NLRB v. llurns Intl. Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), afjg. 441 F.2d 911
(1971), enfordng in part 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970).
1. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
2. For other discussions of the case, see St, Antoine, Judicial Caution and the
Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH, J. L. REF. 269, 270-77
(1973); Recent Decision, 41 GEO. WASH, L. REv, 106 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 50, 247-59 (1972); Note, Labor Law-The Obligations of a
Successor Employer, 51 N.C. L. REv. 337 (1972); Recent Development, 18 VILL. L. REv.
126 (1972).
8. 406 U.S. at 274.
4. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
5. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1970).
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for section 301 actions? If it does not undermine Wiley, does Burns
indicate when employers will be deemed successors in future actions
under section 301 to compel arbitration? Before examining these
questions, however, it is necessary to consider the decisions of Wiley
and Burns.
In Wiley a union sought to compel arbitration concerning the
effect of a merger on certain contract rights6 of the predecessor's
employees who were retained by the successor. Stressing the strong
"'federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration,' " 7 Justice
Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court,8 affirmed the order compelling arbitration:
The objectives of national labor policy ... require that the rightful
prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their businesses
and even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some
protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employment relationship. The transition from one corporate organization
to another will in most cases be eased and industrial strife avoided
if employees' claims continue to be resolved by arbitration . . . .
The preference of national labor policy for arbitration . . .
could be overcome only if other considerations compellingly so
demanded. We find none. While the principles of law governing
ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract an unconsenting
successor to a contracting party, a collective bargaining agreement
is not an ordinary contract. " .•. [I]t is a generalized code to govern
a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate."
•.. [I]t is not in any real sense the simple product of a consensual
relationship.9

The Court noted that the survival of the duty to arbitrate is appropriate only where there is "substantial continuity of identity
in the business enterprise before and after a change."10 The "wholesale transfer" of employees from Interscience, Wiley's predecessor,
to Wiley indicated sufficient continuity, despite the fact that Wiley
was a much larger publisher than Interscience.11
In subsequent section 30 I actions, Wiley was extended beyond
merger situations to purchases of businesses,12 transfers of operations
6. The disputes involved contract provisions that covered seniority, welfare security
benefits, discharge and lay-offs, severance pay, and vacations. 376 U.S. at 554 n.7.
7. 376 U.S. at 549, quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
8. Justice Goldberg took no part in the decision of the case.
9. 376 U.S. at 549-50 (emphasis added), quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
10. 376 U.S. at 551.
11. 376 U.S. at 551.
12. United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968); United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 3!15
F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d
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from a recently terminated subsidiary to a newly acquired subsidiary,13 and judicial sales.14 At the same time, the NLRB was
holding certain employers, which it found to be "successors," to a
duty to bargain with the predecessors' union. 15 Six years after
Wiley, in William ]. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc. 16
the NLRB held for the first time that these employers were also
required, under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),17 to honor the substantive terms of the contract negotiated
by their predecessors.
On April 29, 1967, Wackenhut Corporation, which at that time
provided plant protection services for the Lockheed Aircraft Service
Co., signed a three-year contract with the United Plant Guard
Workers of America (UPG).18 Several months later, the following
year's service contract was awarded to Burns, which had been given
notice of the union's status at the plant before submitting its bid.19
Although Burns hired forty-two guards, twenty-seven of whom had
worked for Wackenhut and :fifteen of whom had been brought in
from other Burns job sites, it refused the UPG's demand that the
UPG be recognized as the bargaining representative of the Lockheed
guards and that Burns abide by the existing contract.20 Instead,
Burns presented the twenty-seven employees with the cards of the
American Federation of Guards (AFG), with which it had several
existing contracts, and told them that membership in AFG was a
prerequisite to employment.21
The Board found that Burns had committed unfair labor practices by its refusals to recognize and bargain with the union and to
954 (9th Cir. 1964); Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel Employees v. Joden, Inc., 262 F. Supp.
390 (D. Mass. 1966). See also McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352, 353 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966) (dictum that there may be sufficient continuity
where only part of a business is purchased).
13. Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
831 (1967).
14. In re Liquidation Holding Corp., 68 L.R.R.M. 2551 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
15. E.g., Overnite Transp. Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d 765 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967); Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1965);
Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1964); South Carolina Granite Co., 58 N.L.R.B.
1448 (1944), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir.
1945).
16. 182 N.LR.B. 348 (1970). The respondent's name was changed from William
J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., to Burns International Security Services,
Inc., in the period between the decisions of the court of appeals, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.
1971), and the Supreme Court.
17. Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of its employees. Section 8(d) further
defines the nature of this duty to bargain. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (d) (1970).
18. 406 U.S. at 275.
19. 406 U.S. at 275.
20. 406 U.S. at 275-76.
21. 406 U.S. at 275.
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honor the previously negotiated contract,22 as well as by its assistance
and recognition of AFG.28 Specifically, the Board found that, "absent
unusual circumstances," section 8(a)(5) required that a successor
honor the previously negotiated contract,24 a decision expressly
based on the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Wiley. 25
Board Member Jenkins dissented, arguing that Wiley's emphasis on
"arbitration and its inherent flexibility and adjustment to unforeseen circumstances," indicated that the agreement should not be
imposed in toto by the Board.26
The Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the Second Circuit,27 unanimously refused to enforce the Board's order insofar as
it required Burns to honor the agreement.28 However, the Board's
finding of a duty to bargain was upheld by a vote of five to four. 29
In addressing the question of Burns' duty to bargain with the
union, the Court stressed several factors. First, it was noted that the
trial examiner had found that the appropriate bargaining unit,
covering those Burns employees who performed protection services
at the Lockheed plant, was the same as that certified under Wackenhut, and that the Court had declined to review the propriety of this
finding.80 Second, the Court pointed out that the union had been
certified only several months earlier as the bargaining representative
for Wackenhut's employees, and that a majority of the employees
hired by Burns had been employed by Wackenhut.81 Under these
circumstances, the Court found it "not unreasonable for the Board
to conclude that the union certified to represent all employees in
the unit still represented a majority of the employees, and that
Burns could not reasonably have entertained a good-faith doubt
about that fact."82 Consequently, Burns was required by the express
22. The Board found that this behavior violated sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(l) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (1) (1970). 182 N.L.R.B. at 348-50.
23. This conduct was found to violate sections 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(l) of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(2), (1) (1970). 182 N.L.R.B. at 348-49.
24. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
25. 182 N.L.R.B. at 349.
26. 182 N.L.R.B. at 351. Member Jenkins also argued that Wiley held that the
arbitration clause of the predecessor's contract only survived for the purpose of determining the successor's obligation concerning certain "vested" rights. 182 N.L.R.B. at
351. This latter argument, however, appears to be erroneous, for the Court's reasoning
in Wiley did not rely on the nature of the contract rights involved. Furthermore, it
is not clear what rights are "vested." In one sense all contract rights are vested, as
Judge Brown pointed out in rejecting an argument similar to that made by Jenkins.
United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38, 44 (5th Cir. 1967).
27. William J. Burns Intl. Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (1971).
28. 406 U.S. at 291. The finding of a violation in aiding the AFG was not challenged
by Burns. 406 U.S. at 276.
29. 406 U.S. at 280-81.
30. 406 U.S. at 277-78.
31. 406 U.S. at 278.
32. 406 U.S. at 278.
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mandates of sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) 83 of the NLRA to bargain with
the predecessor's union.
One commentator has suggested that the Court's reasoning narrows the test for successorship in duty-to-bargain cases by focusing
on whether a majority of the employees of the successor employer
had been previously employed by the predecessor employer.34 Although the Court did not say that the hiring of a majority of the
successor's employees from the predecessor's work force is the only
test, it appears to have found it essential in holding Burns to a duty
to bargain.sis This test, however, does not depart from the Board's
prior approach. It is true that some decisions described the test for
determining what is a "successor" for purposes of imposing a duty to
bargain as being based on the absence of a substantial change in
the employing industry.36 Another Board decision listed several
factors that may evidence successorship--such as substantial continuity of business operations; use of the same plant; the same or
substantially the same work force; the same jobs and working conditions; the same supervisors; the same machinery, equipment, and
methods of production; and the same product or services.37 Yet, in
cases where a majority of the successor's work force was not composed
of its predecessor's employees, the Board has almost invariably found
no duty to bargain.38 Therefore, in practice the majority-hiring test
was often decisive even prior to Burns.
If the "recent certification" of the union as bargaining repre33. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a} (1970).
34. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 2, at 252.
35. 406 U.S. at 279, 295. There is some ambiguity as to which "majority" the Court
found determinative. Its opinion referred several times to the fact that the successor
had hired a majority of the predecessor's employees. 406 U.S. at 278• .Board decisions
appear, on occasion, to have taken this factor into account. Georgetown Stainless Mfg.
Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 7-8, 80 L.R.R.M. 1615, 1616 (1972); Lincoln Private
Police, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 103, at 13, 76 L.R.R.M. 1727, 1730 (1971). However, the
Court placed much more emphasis upon the fact that a majority of the successor's
employees had been previously employed by the predecessor, 406 U.S. at 280-81.
36. E.g., NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303, 304 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB
v. Alamo White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 1959); Lincoln Private
Police, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 103, at IO, 76 L.R.R.M. 1727, 1729 (1971).
37. Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 6, 80 L.R.R.M. 1615,
1616 (1972).
38. Professor Goldberg suggested in The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor
Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 735, 793-801 (1969), that the most important factor in
determining the extent of the successor's obligations in a Board proceeding is whether
a majority of the successor's work force was employed by the predecessor. He found
only two cases imposing a duty to bargain when there was no such majority, and a
court of appeals denied enforcement in the later case. John Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc.,
141 NL.R.B. 1065 (1963), enforcement denied, 338 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1964); Firchau
Logging Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1960). The author of this Note has found no other
cases in which the Board found a successorship when this factor was not present. If
a majority of the new employer's work force was employed by the predecessor, Goldberg
suggested that the Board will almost certainly find it to be a successor absent a significant change in the method of doing business. There is judicial authority for this
position. E.g., Emerald Maintenance, Inc. v. NLRB, 464 F.2d 698, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1972).

576

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:571

sentative, a factor mentioned several times by the Court,30 were
necessary in order to impose a duty to bargain on a successor, Burns
might narrow prior standards. But certification at all, much less a
recent certification, should not be viewed as essential. When a
majority of the new employer's work force has been retained from
the predecessor, a presumption is arguably raised that the incumbent
union represents a majority of the new work force.40 While a recent
certification supports this presumption, other evidence may be sufficient. Thus, at least one court after Burns has upheld the Board's
imposition upon a successor of a duty to bargain with a predecessor's
union that had never been certified.41
Having determined that Bums had a duty to bargain with the
incumbent union, the Court proceeded to hold that the Board
could not require Bums to honor the substantive terms of its predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement. Like the court of appeals,42
the Supreme Court based its decision on section 8(d) of the NLRA,
which declares that the existence of a duty to bargain "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
a concession."43 Under the Court's interpretation, this section makes
free collective bargaining an "express statutory mandate" that limits
the remedial powers of the Board.44 While some ambiguity may
remain,45 the tone of the opinion suggests that the limitation is
absolute. But the provision need not have been so interpreted. The
Court could have followed the Board's lead46 and used the Wiley
fiction that a successor is treated as a party to the agreement negotiated by its predecessor even though it did not agree to the contract
in a common-law sense.47 Moreover, there is no theoretical reason
why section 8(d) need be read as absolute. The interest in free
collective bargaining found in section 8(d) could have been balanced
39. 406 U.S. at 278-81.
40. See note 82 infra.
41. To be sure, dicta in Burns indicates that a good faith doubt could not have
been claimed in the face of a recent Board certification. But that is not to say that
Burns also supports the obverse. Lack of certification does not by itself sustain a
finding of a good faith doubt. See 406 U.S. at 279, n.3 •••• When, as here, there
is at the least a prima fade showing that the union represented a majority of
the employees within a year of the change in ownership, it must be presumed
that the union's status continued beyond the changeover.
NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 468 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 1972).
42. 441 F.2d at 915-16.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
The Court's interpretation of section 8(d) was based on its earlier decision in H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), which held that the policy of freedom of
contract expressed in section 8(d) limits the remedial powers of the Board. 406 U.S.
at 283-84.
44. 406 U.S. at 281-84.
45. See text accompanying notes 58-65 infra.
46. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
47. 376 U.S. at 550.
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against the interests of employee security and industrial stability, as
it was in Wiley. 4 s
However, from a policy standpoint, the Court's interpretation
of section S(d) is understandable in the context of its discussion of
Wiley. In distinguishing Wiley, the Court placed greatest emphasis
on its procedural setting: "Wiley arose in the context of a [section]
30 I suit to compel arbitration, not in the context of an unfair labor
practice proceeding where the Board is expressly limited by the
provisions of [section] S(d)."49 At first glance, this seems to make the
union's remedy depend on a mere choice of forum, but it actually
reflects a distinction based on the ability of each forum to deal with
the problem. The Burns Court emphasized that Wiley was founded
on the national preference for arbitration of labor disputes. 6° It is
submitted that there are strong policy reasons for preferring arbitration as a means of deciding if contract obligations are to be imposed
on a successor, for an arbitrator has the advantages of flexibility and
expertise in contract interpretation, which are not possessed by the
Board. Wiley does not permit a union to enforce the contract as a
whole in an initial action under section 301; were that the case, the
remedy would depend on a choice of forums. Instead, it merely
allows the union to compel arbitration, leaving the arbitrator to
decide what specific obligations survive. 61
The Court distinguished Wiley in two other respects, both of
which focus on the relationship between the old and the new
employer rather than on the procedural context of the litigation.
First, it noted that Wiley's "narrower holding dealt with a merger
occurring against a background of state law that embodied the
general rule that in merger situations the surviving corporation is
liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation." 62 If this
distinction were persuasive, Burns would virtually limit Wiley to its
precise facts. However, such an anal_ysis would ignore the plain
meaning of Wiley: On the authority 'of Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills,153 the Wiley Court had no difficulty in concluding
that federal law controlled; 64 and the rationale of Wiley clearly
extended beyond mergers to other changes in corporate structure
48. !176 U.S. at 549-51.
49. 406 U.S. at 285.
50. 406 U.S. at 285-86.
51. !176 U.S. at 555.
52. 406 U.S. at 286.
53. !15!1 U.S. 448 (1957).
54. !176 U.S. at 548.
To hold that state law controls in a section !101 action might raise substantial
constitutional questions if the parties are of nondiverse citizenship. See Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, !15!1 U.S. 448, 460-546 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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or ownership,115 an interpretation that lower courts have followed
without exception.56 Thus, it is unlikely that the Burns Court intended to suggest that Wiley be limited to its facts. 57
Second, the Court pointed out that, while Wiley involved a
merger, "(h]ere there was no merger, sale of assets, and there were
no dealings whatsoever between Wackenhut and Bums. On the contrary, they were competitors for the same work." 58 This distinction
is substantial, for on this very point four Justices dissented from the
Court's holding that imposed a duty to bargain on Bums.119 Consequently, it has been suggested that the question whether the Board
can impose a duty to honor the contract where there is some transfer
of assets between the two employers may still be open.6° First, the
Court ,'studiously avoided" the use of the term "successor," 61 which
might suggest that it would be willing to impose a duty to honor in
cases involving traditional successor employers. Second, the Court
noted that Bums' mere hiring of employees was "a wholly insufficient basis for implying ... that Bums ... must be held to have
agreed to honor" the contract. 6~ This may leave open the possibility
that had there been some more direct nexus between the old and
the new employers, a sufficient basis might have been found. These
indications, however, are not compelling on a reading of the opinion
as a whole. The Court's discussion of the prohibition found in
section 8(d) suggests a restriction that encompasses all Board proceedings, not merely those in which there have been no dealings
between the employers. In addition, the policy of settling labor
disputes through arbitration, which overrode the concern for freedom of contract in Wiley, 63 is not a factor in any Board proceeding.
Finally, Burns may reveal a shift in the Court's evaluation of competing national labor relations policies, with increased weight
given to freedom of contract.64 Therefore, the most natural reading
of the Court's opinion, and one that has been adopted by the
NLRB,65 is that, while the Board can impose a duty to bargain on
55. The Wiley Court, describing its ruling, said, "[I']his is so as much in cases like
the present, where the contracting employer disappears into another by merger, as
in those in which one owner replaces another but the business entity remains the
same." 376 U.S. at 549.
56. See cases cited in notes 12-14 supra.
57. For a discussion of the consistency of Burns and Wiley, see text accompanying
notes 89-127 infra.
58. 406 U.S. at 286.
59. See text accompanying notes 87-88 infra.
60. St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 276; The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 2,
at 258.
61. 406 U.S. at 296 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
62. 406 U.S. at 287,
63. 376 U.S. at 549-!>1.
64. See text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
65. E.g., Howard Johnson Co., 198 N.LR.B. No. 98, 80 L.R.R.M. 1769 (1972).
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certain new employers, it can never impose a duty to honor substantive contract terms.
If Burns is read this broadly, one qualification must be considered. It is arguable that such an interpretation of Burns fosters
undesirable inconsistencies in the imposition of labor obligations.
One observer of the labor scene, in commenting on Burns, has expressed the view that "in most of these successorship cases, bargaining rights and contract rights should stand together or fall together,''66 noting:
The same considerations of employee free choice, industrial stability,
flexibility of business arrangements, and so on, that militate for or
against the survival of bargaining rights also militate for or against
the survival of contract rights.67
Certainly, the problem of inconsistency would most likely arise in
Burns-type competitive-bidding situations, the context in which this
suggestion was made, where there is a duty to bargain and may
be no duty to arbitrate in a section 301 proceeding.68 However, to
the extent that contract rights are enforceable through section 30 I
actions for arbitration, no inconsistency need exist. 69 While Burns
does preclude the imposition of a duty to honor substantive terms
in Board proceedings, the more appropriate forum of arbitration is
still available to determine if contract rights should be imposed.
Having decided the issues of duty to bargain and duty to honor,
the Court went on to hold, unanimously, that the Board's order
requiring Bums to compensate its employees for losses caused by
Bums' failure to honor the contract could not be sustained on the
ground that Bums had unilaterally changed existing terms and conditions of employment when it specified the initial terms on which
it would hire the former Wackenhut employees. 70 The Court stated:
It is difficult to understand how Burns could be said to have
changed unilaterally any pre-existing term or condition of employment . . . when it had no previous relationship whatsoever to the
66. St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 276.
67. Id.
68. For a discussion of the duty to arbitrate in these situations, see text accompanying notes 140-47 infra.
69. This discussion, of course, assumes that the collective-bargaining agreements in
question contain arbitration clauses. This assumption is not unrealistic; one survey
has found that 94 per cent of all collective-bargaining agreements have some form of
arbitration clause. BNA, BASIC PATI'ERNS IN UNION CONTRAC'fS 1[ 51:6 (7th ed. 1971).
The obligations of a successor employer in a section 301 action when there is no
arbitration clause remain unclear.
70. 406 U.S. at 292-96. In NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Court upheld an
order of the NLRB that found that section 8(a)(5) was violated when an employer
instituted changes in the terms and conditions of employment without first consulting
the union with which it was negotiating.
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bargaining unit and ... no outstanding terms and conditions from
which a change could be inferred.71

Only when "it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to
retain all of the employees in the unit" must it bargain with the
incumbent union over initial terms.72 In other cases it may set its
own terms until its obligation to bargain matures on the hiring of
its entire work force, a majority of whom were its predecessor's
employees.73
It has been suggested74 that this analysis overrules Overnite
Transportation Co.,75 in which the Board held that the successor
had a duty to bargain with the union from the day it took over the
predecessor's business. If the Burns holding on this point is limited
to situations where there have been no dealings between the two
employers, it may not encroach upon Overnite in traditional successorship cases.76 Such a limitation, however, is unlikely because
the Court stated explicitly that "a successor employer is ordinarily
free to set initial terms on which it will hire the employees of a
predecessor,"77 and the new employer will be required to bargain
with the union before setting initial terms when "it is perfectly
clear" that all the old employees will be retained. In any event, the
Court did not expressly overrule Overnite, which was cited twice in
support of Justice White's argument.78 Perhaps the Court felt that
Overnite fell within the "perfectly clear" exception since Ovemite
had retained all of its predecessor's employees.79 Moreover, the
Court made it clear that when the duty to bargain matures the
requirements of Overnite would come into effect.80 To the extent
that the Court's analysis is inconsistent with Overnite, it affects only
the timing of the duty to bargain and not the scope of that duty.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Brennan and Powell, concurred in the Court's decision insofar as it
held that Bums had no duty to honor the substantive terms of
71. 406 U.S. at 294 (emphasis original).
72. 406 U.S. at 294-95.
73. 406 U.S. at 295.
One may question why the Court makes an exception only when it is perfectly clear
that all of the predecessor's employees are to be retained. Since the Court would impose
a duty to bargain when a new employer bas hired a majority of its work force from
its predecessor's, a more consistent approach would bar unilateral changes when it is
"perfectly clear" that that majority is to be retained.
74. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 2, at 258.
75. 157 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966), enforced, 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 838 (1967).
76. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 2, at 259.
77. 406 U.S. at 294.
78. 406 U.S. at 293, 294.
79. 372 F .2d at 768.
80. 406 U.S. at 294.
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Wackenhut's collective-bargaining agreement, but dissented from the
Court's imposing a duty to bargain on Bums. 81 Justice Rehnquist
initially expressed disagreement with two facets of the Court's
analysis. First, he pointed out that it was not "mathematically
demonstrable" that the incumbent union was the choice of a
majority of Burns' work force. Even though twenty-seven of Bums'
forty-two employees had been previously employed by Wackenhut,
there was no indication that they had all supported the union in the
election at Wackenhut.82 Second, he criticized the Court's reliance
on the Board's determination that the previous unit was still appropriate. 83 Both of these determinations, Justice Rehnquist argued,
themselves depended on the assumption that Bums was a successor.84
Therefore, the issue, as framed by Justice Rehnquist, became
whether Bums was a successor.
Apparently finding Wiley controlling even though it did not
arise in a Board proceeding, 85 the dissent insisted that the policy
of employee security on which Wiley was based should be limited
to some degree by other interests, such as freedom of contract and
the employer's need to remain competitive. 86 Justice Rehnquist
argued that these limits would be passed were Bums found to be a
successor in the absence of the transfer of a single asset from Wackenhut to Bums.87 He would require that there be continuity "at
least in part on the employer's side of the equation, rather than only
on that of the employees" before an employer is held to be a
successor for Board or section 301 purposes.88
Thus, Justice Rehnquist's opinion has direct implications for
section 30 I actions, as well as Board proceedings. First, however, it
81. 406 U.S. at 296.
82. 406 U.S. at 297. This analysis is correct if there were more than five antiunion
votes in the election at Wackenhut. However, the NLRA does not require a union
to rcdemonstrate continually its majority status. In fact, there are certain established
rules, ~uch as the contract bar and certification bar, that for policy reasons ensure the
union's status although it has in fact lost its majority status. E.g., Brooks v. NLRB,
348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954) (certification bar); Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B.
1384, 1387 (1963) (contract bar). Similarly, in imposing obligations on successors the
presumption of continued majority status is defensible as a matter of policy because
it eliminates time-consuming determinations, promotes industrial stability, and, in most
cases, does in fact accord with the wishes of the employees. See Goldberg, supra note
38, at 789-92.
83. 406 U.S. at 297-98.
s.t. 406 U.S. at 297-99.
85. Justice Rehnquist did show some awareness of the difference between the
Board's doctrine and that established under section 301 in Wiley when he referred to
Wiley as employing "a form of the 'successor' doctrine." 406 U.S. at 299 (emphasis
added). For a discussion of differences in the two successorship doctrines, see text
accompanying notes 128-32 infra.
86. 406 U.S. at 302-04.
87. 406 U.S. at 304-05.
88. 406 U.S. at 305.
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must be determined whether Wiley retains any vitality after Burns. 60
While Burns distinguished Wiley and did not expressly overrule
it, much of the language in Burns suggests that the Court may be
re-evaluating the role of the labor contract. Wiley described the
collective-bargaining agreement as a "'generalized code'" that was
"not in any real sense the simple product of a consensual relationship."80 In contrast, both the majority91 and the dissent92 in Burns
stressed notions of consent that are derived from common-law
contract theory. Moreover, Justice White suggested that the policies
of employee job security and industrial stability that Wiley found
"could be overcome only if other considerations compellingly so
demanded" 98 must be subordinated to other policies such as freedom of collective bargaining.94
Is there a valid distinction between the two cases that would
explain this apparent shift in tone? It was suggested above0~ that
Justice White emphasized the difference between a Board proceeding, subject to section 8(d), and section 301 actions to compel
arbitration; but section 8(d) in itself is not a sufficient reason for
treating the two forums differently. 96 The issue, therefore, must
be viewed on a policy level: Assuming that Burns precludes the
imposition of contract rights in all Board actions, does it make sense
to say that such rights may still be imposed through arbitration?
If not, Burns may be the first in a line of narrowing decisions that
eventually would limit Wiley to its facts or even expressly overrule
the 1964 case.97 The thesis of the following discussion is that there
are legitimate policy reasons for leaving the imposition of substantive contract terms to the arbitrator.
First, the arbitrator has "special skill and experience" in contract
interpretation, as was recently acknowledged in Collyer Insulated
Wire,96 where the Board stated its policy of deferring to arbitrators
89. It is clear that Burns has narrowed the scope given to Wiley by at least one
commentator, who had urged that the policies emphasized by Justice Harlan required
the :Board to impose a duty to honor the contract under section 8(a)(5). Goldberg, supra
note 38, at 809-13.
90. 376 U.S. at 550, quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
91. 406 U.S. at 287.
92. 406 U.S. at 303.
93. 376 U.S. at 549-50.
94. 406 U.S. at 287.
95, See tex.t accompanying notes 42-51 supra.
96. See tex.t accompanying notes 42-48 supra.
97. The Court's use of subsequent, inconsistent cases as a rationale for overruling
a decision is described in Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963
SUP. CT. R.Ev. 211, 223-26.
98. 192 N.L.R.:B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
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in such matters.99 Second, the arbitrator, whose role is created by a
given contract, has greater flexibility than the Board. He need not
formulate general rules but can focus on the contract that is before
him.100 Nor is he required to follow precedent, other than that
established in the industry in question.101 Thus, the arbitrator may
examine fact situations in detail, evaluate considerations of fairness,
and devise flexible remedies102 when determining what obligations
are to be imposed under a contract.
There may be some question concerning the degree of flexibility
that the arbitrator has in modifying obligations under the contract
to reflect the unusual problems that might arise under a successor
employer,103 and the tone of the Supreme Court's decision in Burns
could itself have an inhibiting effect on arbitrators.104 However, it
is settled that the arbitrator's function is to resolve problems that
are not adequately provided for in the contract.105 A successorship
situation, almost by definition, will not be adequately covered by
the contract, for, even when a transfer is anticipated, it is difficult
to predict what changes will occur. The ability of the arbitrator to
react flexibly in these circumstances was expressly approved by the
Court in Wiley 106 and elaborated in later cases applying that decision.107 As long as the arbitrator does not impose new obligations
99. But cf. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 351 (1969) (Board can order employer to sign
contract and pay benefits under contract when employer wrongfully refuses to sign
the negotiated agreement).
100. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
101. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960).
102. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
103. Compare United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895
(3d Cir. 1964), with Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954,
958 (9th Cir. 1964).
104. For an example of the inhibiting effects of H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S.
99 (1970), and the Second Circuit's decision in Burns, see Hubacber Cadillac, Inc., 57
Lab. Arb. 227 (1971) (Updegraff, Arbitrator). Another arbitrator, however, has made
it quite clear that he does not feel bound by Burns in handling claims made in a
successorship case. New England Lead Burning Corp., 58 Lab. Arb. 1254, 1258 (1972)
(Kiefe, Arbitrator).
105. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-81
(1960).
106. Discussing the potential infringement on the interests of the successor's nonunionized employees, the Court said, "[W]e have little doubt that within the flexible
procedures of arbitration a solution can be reached which would avoid disturbing
labor relations in the Wiley plant." 376 U.S. at 552 n.5.
107. Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6, 13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 381 (1967); United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 (3d
Cir. 1964).
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not founded on the predecessor's contract,1° 8 or apply statutory law
or common law, rather than the terms of the contract,109 he should
be given a broad latitude in interpretation.
The Board, on the other hand, is constricted by the need to
formulate general rules and follow precedent. The complex factual
situations that arise in the successorship area pose special difficulties
for the Board because procedural and time limitations prevent it
from closely evaluating every clause at issue between a successor and
a union. Perhaps for this reason, the Board in Burns took an all-ornothing approach: ordinarily, the entire contract would be binding
on the successor, while in "unusual circumstances," left undefined,
the successor would not be held to any contract obligations.110
Several of the Board's subsequent decisions suggest that such an
approach is inadequate when it would be equitable to impose part
but not all of a contract.
In Emerald Maintenance, Inc.,111 one of the first cases in which
the Board found "unusual circumstances,''112 the new employer was
awarded a government contract to provide maintenance and housing
services, previously provided by two other contractors, on a United
States Air Force base. The Board held that Emerald, although it
was a successor employer with a duty to bargain, was not bound to
honor its predecessors' collective-bargaining agreements.113 First, the
Board felt that an exception was necessary because the United States
Comptroller General had refused to consider the agreed-upon increase in wages when specifying the prevailing rates to bidders for
the government service contract.114 However, it is questionable
whether the actions of federal "agencies primarily charged with
108. Wiley states that the union cannot use arbitration to gain new rights against
the successor employer. 376 U.S. at 554-55.
109. [A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel 8c Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
110. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
111. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1437 (1971), enforced in part, 464 F.2d 698
(5th Cir. 1972). The Fifth Circuit upheld the Board's finding that Emerald need not
honor the previously negotiated contract on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision
in Bums. Also on the basis of that decision, the court refused to enforce the Board's
order of restitution of economic benefits withheld or denied. The court said that it was
not "perfectly clear'' that the employer planned to retain all of the predecessor's
employees when it made unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of employ•
ment. 464 F.2d at 701. But the court did enforce the Board's order requiring Emerald
to bargain with the union. 464 F.2d at 701-03.
112. For another instance of "unusual circumstances," see G.T. &: E. Data Servs.
Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 79 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1971).
113. 188 N.LR.B. No. 139, at 6-8, 76 L.R.R.l\I. at 1438-39.
114. 188 N.L.R.B. No. 139, at 6-8, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1438-39.
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administration of the Federal Service Contract Act" 115 should be
permitted to disturb national labor relations policy. In addition, the
bidders had been notified by the union before submitting their
bids,116 so the increases could have been included in their calculations. Second, the Board suggested that its decision in Burns had
assumed that the successor was able to adjust the terms of the contract during negotiations to accommodate the demands of the collective-bargaining agreement, 117 while Emerald, the Board said, "suggests the hazards" of applying that remedy in annual-bidding
situations.118 These hazards, however, were present in Burns, which
itself involved annual bidding. In fact, the Board in that case felt
that this factor increased the need for stability, which would be
served by the survival of the collective-bargaining agreement.119
Neither the nature of the government contract nor the problems
inherent in the annual-bidding situation seem to justify a general
exception to Burns. Rather, the Board seems to have taken an ad hoc
approach. Its reluctance to follow Burns may have been due to the
unfairness of imposing a wage increase on an employer that had
relied on the federal bureaucracy in failing to include the increase
in its bid.120 While it may be unjust to enforce the entire contract in
such circumstances, there is no need to disregard it completely. An
arbitrator could adapt the remedy to the particular situation.
Conversely, on at least one occasion, the Board failed to find
"unusual circumstances" when it might have been appropriate to
do so. In Interstate 65 Corp.,12 1 the Board imposed the entire contract on a successor that argued that it had acquired the business
under economic duress through an informal foreclosure. The decision of the trial examiner, accepted in this respect by the Board,122
said that the employer's argument went to the form of the transfer,
which was not controlling in determining whether there was a
successor.123 However, economic duress raises instead the question
whether it is fair to impose obligations on an employer even if it is
a successor. The Board may have been reluctant to approach the
problem in these terms because it was trying to develop a uniform
general approach, while an arbitrator would have had no such
restraints.
115. 188 N.LR.B.
116. 188 N.L.R.B.
117. 188 N.L.R.B.
ll8. 188 N.L.R.B.
119. 182 N.LR.B.
120. 188 N.L.R.B.
121. 186 N.L.R.B.
(6th Cir. 1971).
122. 186 N.LR.B.
123. 186 N.L.R.B.

No. 139, at 8, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1439.
No. 139, at 5, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1438.
No. 139, at 6, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1438.
No. 139, at 8, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1439.
at 350.
No. 139, at 5, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1438.
No. 41, 75 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1970), enforced in part, 453 F.2d 269
No. 41, at 3, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1405.
No. 41, at 12-13, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1405.
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The flexibility of arbitration, as the Court pointed out in the
Steelworkers Trilog;y,12 4 can serve the ends of employee security and
industrial stability without sacrificing the interests of the employer.
The best approach would read Wiley and Burns together as affirming the arbitrator's special expertise in determining the contractual
obligations of successors.125
One problem with this approach remains to be considered. Subject to a limited exception, the Burns Court would not find a section 8(a)(5) violation when a new employer has unilaterally set the
initial terms under which it hired a predecessor's employees.126 It
can be argued that allowing arbitration and enforcement of different
terms of employment set out in its predecessor's collective-bargaining
agreement would be inconsistent with Burns and thus would violate
the policy favoring consistent interpretation of a statutory scheme.127
However, the Court in Burns established no affirmative right to set
initial terms, but merely held that to do so did not constitute an
unfair labor practice. More importantly, even if there is some
theoretical conflict, the policy against inconsistency should be outweighed by the stronger policies favoring arbitration as a means
of fostering industrial stability.
While Burns need not undermine Wiley, it may affect what will
be deemed to be a successor employer for section 30 I purposes.
Under Wiley a new employer can be compelled to arbitrate the
extent of his obligation under a predecessor's collective-bargaining
agreement when there is "substantial continuity of identity" in the
employing industry.128 In contrast to its role in the majority-hiring
test for imposing a duty to bargain,129 the number of the predecessor's employees hired by the new employer is not determinative in
124. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
125. As will be recalled, Member Jenkins argued in his dissent in Burns that Wiley
did not apply to Board proceedings because the Court had emphasized the flexibility
of arbitration. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 70-80 supra.
127. Cf. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), in which the Court inter•
preted the exemption from the antitrust laws for certain union activities contained in
section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), in light of the ban on enjoining
labor disputes contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
Saying that legislation must not be interpreted in a "spirit of mutilating narrowness,"
the Court held that it would be "strange indeed" to allow a criminal indictment under
the antitrust laws when the activities involved could not be enjoined. 312 U.S. at 235.
However, the Court did not base its holding only on the possible inconsistency, but
also on the belief that "[t]he underlying aim of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to
restore the broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton
Act but which was frustrated ••• by unduly restrictive judicial construction." 312 U.S.
at 235-36.
128. 376 U.S. at 551.
129. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
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section 301 actions, although it may be considered.13° For example,
in Wiley itself a duty to arbitrate was imposed upon the successor
despite the fact that the predecessor's employees formed only a small
part of the successor's work force; 131 the new employer's hiring of a
majority of its predecessor's employees was merely evidence of
"similarity and continuity of operation."132 The substantial-continuity test serves the interests of employee job security and industrial stability by meeting the expectations of the employees. 133 Nor
did Wiley ignore the employer's interests. Its acknowledgement that
the new employer, unlike the employees, can negotiate over the
terms of the transfer134 may suggest that the Court believed that
the employer's interests were adequately protected. After Burns
the substantial-continuity test remains applicable in section 301
130. It should be noted that the Wiley test, unlike the .Board majority-hiring test,
may be satisfied even if the new employer does not hire any of its predecessor's employees. The courts have left the decision to the arbitrator when the union disputes a
new employer's failure to hire the former employer's employees. Monroe Sander Corp.
v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967): Detroit Local Joint
Exec. Bd., Hotel Employees v. Howard Johnson Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 2329 (E.D. Mich.,
Aug. 22, 1972). However, an arbitrator's order to rehire might not be enforced by a
court, especially if enforcement would require the large-scale displacement of the
successor's employees. Fearing that such an order, or apprehension concerning the
possibility of such an order, might cause employee unrest, Chief Judge Lumbard
dissented from the arbitration order in Monroe Sander. He would have held that the
union's demand that some of the successor's employees be discharged to make room
for the predecessor's employees was "'so plainly unreasonable' " as to be " 'nonarbitrable.'" 377 F.2d at 14, quoting John Wiley 8: Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,
555 (1964).
Of course, discrimination in hiring against union members employed by its prede•
cessor may subject a successor employer to an unfair labor practice charge under
section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), for "discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment" in order to discourage union membership.
131. 376 U.S. at 551. A minority union can bring a section 301 action to enforce
labor contracts. Retail Clerks, Locals 128 &: 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17
(1962).
132. 376 U.S. at 551.
133. If the union's contract with the predecessor has a successorship clause, stating
that a new employer will be bound under the contract, there is more objective evidence
of the expectations of the employees. However, such a clause is not essential to holding
a new employer to his predecessor's labor obligations. Neither Wiley nor Bums involved contracts containing successorship clauses, and in neither case was their absence
considered relevant to the question of what the new employer's obligations should be.
Furthermore, no case has been found in which the court considered the presence of a
successorship clause to be determinative or even evidentiary of whether a new employer was a successor, with the possible exception of Detroit Local Joint Exec. :Bd.,
Hotel Employees v. Howard Johnson Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 2329, 2333 (E.D. Mich., Aug. 22,
1972). It is true that these clauses give no indication of the successor's intent; but they
are evidence of the union's intent, and they give the new employer notice of possible
obligations. Arbitrators, unlike courts, have recognized their evidentiary importance.
See Wamco, Inc., 57 Lab. Arb. 1220 (1971) (Roper, Arbitrator) (no successorship clause);
Printing Indus., Inc., 56 Lab. Arb. 296 (1971) Gackson, Arbitrator) (successorship
clause present); Sanborn's Motor Express, 44 Lab. Arb. 346 (1965) (Wallen, Arbitrator)
(successorship clause present).
134. 376 U.S. at 549.
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actions, for there is little possibility that the Court intended to limit
Wiley to its facts. 135 But it is another matter to determine in what
particular fact situations such continuity may be found.
The dissent of Justice Rehnquist is a reliable indication that
at least four Justices will limit Wiley to situations in which there
is some transfer of assets, tangible or intangible, between the old
and the new employing entities.136 This requirement should not
mean that there must be direct transactions between the employer
with which arbitration is sought and the employer that negotiated
the contract. Where, for example, the business passes through a
third party that is an intermediary, the situation may be viewed
conceptually as a chain of successors, each of which acquires labor
obligations for the period, however short, in which it holds the
business. This might be the situation when, for example, a franchisee
sells to a franchisor that in tum sells to a new franchisee. It should
also be noted that the dissent considered the transfer of intangible
assets also to be evidence of continuity on the employer's side. Thus,
Justice Rehnquist's requirements might be met even in a service
industry context, if the new employer acquires "goodwill," contract
rights, or a franchise license from a predecessor.
The most troubling question is raised in a competitive-bidding
situation such as Burns. In such a case, there is no transfer of assets,
since the service contract is not passed from one employer to the
other, but is created anew with each employer; therefore, Justice
Rehnquist's conditions would not be met. But the majority opinion
in Burns appears to have left open the question whether arbitration
could be enforced in section 301 actions in this situation.
It may be contended that the policies of industrial stability and
employee job security in some cases require that an employer be
found to be a successor even where there are no dealings between
the employers.137 On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist, concerned
with fairness to the employer, suggests that the "legitimate expectations of the employees" require at most that the employer be bound
only when there is some transfer of assets.138 This test, however, is
unnecessarily limited. A more complete test for continuity would
examine the similarity of the operations as a whole139-the business
functions, the jobs performed by the employees, and the method of
supervision, as well as any transfer of assets. Even in a competitivebidding case, these other factors evidence both the expectations
135. See text accompanying notes 49-57 supra.
136. 406 U.S. at 305.
137. See Goldberg, supra note 38, at 749-50.
138. 406 U.S. at 305.
139. Wiley itself focused on the "relative similarity and continuity of operation,"
not on any transfer of assets. 376 U.S. at 551.
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of the employees and the ease with which the new employer can
assume the labor obligations of the old employer. It is true that at
first glance the terms "competitor" and "successor" seem to be
directly opposed. However, such labels, while they provide some
guidance, may oversimplify a complex problem. In essence, "successor" is a conclusory term, which may mean nothing more than a
new employer upon which an old employer's labor obligations are
imposed. Specifically, the question should be whether it is fair to
both employer and employees, and desirable in terms of national
labor relations policies, to impose a duty to arbitrate in a given
competitive-bidding case.
If the question is viewed in this light, several impediments to
applying Wiley in a competitive-bidding case must be considered.
First, as Justice Rehnquist suggests,140 the imposition of continuing
labor obligations may disrupt the competitive status of all the
bidders, as well as that of the industry to which the bids are submitted.141 Yet, Wiley indicated that the employer's interest in
competition must be limited when it infringes on the security of
the employees and threatens industrial stability.142 Stability and
security require special protection in an annual-bidding situation.143
Moreover, while holding a winning bidder to a duty to arbitrate
may in some cases disturb competition by "import[ing] unwarranted
rigidity into labor-management relations,"144 failing to apply Wiley
is even more likely to put the employer that has the existing contract at a competitive disadvantage. It will be held to the terms of
the negotiated collective-bargaining agreement if it is awarded the
next contract, while all other bidders would be exempt from any
such obligation.
Reluctance to find that a competitive bidder is a successor may
also stem from the fear that the bidder may have had no notice of
its possible obligations to the union. Absent notice, it may well be
unfair to impose labor obligations on an employer that had no
chance to make appropriate adjustments in its bid.145 But if the new
140. 406 U.S. at 307-08.
141. Justice Rehnquist, of course, would not impose a duty to bargain on a new
employer in an annual-bidding situation. This approach could discourage employee
organization in the service industries. Unions would be at a disadvantage if they were
forced to reorganize employees and reprove their majority status each time a new employer won the contract. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 2, at 252 n.35.
142. 376 U.S. at 549.
143. It might be contended that the duty to bargain imposed by the Court in Burns
gives sufficient protection to employee expectations and industrial stability. But imposing only a duty to bargain would mean that agreements would have to be negotiated each time the employer changed, possibly every year. This would subject
employees and the recipients of their services to the possibilities of annual strikes and
might deny them the benefits of longer-term contracts.
144. 406 U.S. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
145. The Court in Wiley said, "[WJe do not rule out the possibility that a union
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employer has had notice from the union of the employees' expectations, it is less inequitable to require it to arbitrate under its
predecessor's collective-bargaining agreement, for it could have consulted that document to determine the extent of the obligation.146
Therefore, while a collective-bargaining agreement might logically
be imposed through arbitration against a "successor" even in a
competitive-bidding situation when there is substantial evidence of
continuity in the operations considered as a whole, the imposition
of such obligations should be conditioned on the union's informing
all bidders of the negotiated contract. Giving the successor notice
poses no special difficulties. In industries with regular bidding there
would be little danger that the union would be unaware of the
existence of prospective new employers and thus fail to notify them.
It should be noted that even if a bidder has notice, it will not
be able to predict the extent to which the arbitrator will hold it to
the predecessor's contract and thus may not be able to determine its
labor costs precisely. However, bidding necessarily involves risks and
estimates. Holding the winning bidder to arbitrate with the union
under section 30 I would not increase its risks, but would rather
define one of the variables more precisely. Since the arbitrator could
give the union only rights included in the contract,147 the bidder
would know the upper limit on its labor costs for the term of the
contract.
In conclusion, Burns need not be read as a drastic curtailment
of the Court's earlier decision in Wiley. While considerable question
may exist in regard to competitive-bidding situations, section 30 I
actions to compel arbitration should remain available, at least in
the ordinary successorship case. Read together, Burns and Wiley
can ensure that the imposition of contract obligations on successor
employers will be handled with a desirable measure of flexibility.
might abandon its right to arbitration by failing to make its claims known." 376 U.S.
at 551.
146. See, e.g., Walker Bros., 41 Lab. Axb. 844 (1963) (Crawford, Arbitrator).
147. John Wiley &: Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555 (1964).

